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Amethod developed by amultidisciplinary team at Columbia
indicates that there isasubstantial risk of innocent fatalities in
the operation of the death penalty, and reveals aneed for ongoing risk assessment
inthe process of administering the penalty.

BY JAMES S. LIEBMAN
nnocent fatalities are a concern
of all social activity with a capacity to kill. This is especially true
when the social activity is the death
penalty since an innocent person's
execution is not simply a tragic collateral consequence of activity with a
non-fatal objective. Instead, the taking of life is the goalof the enterprise,
and the killing is the intended act of
the state.
There is another difference between accidental fatalities in other
social activities and those that occur
when the capital system miscarries.
Typically, the former fatalities are
easy to spot and quantify; the latter
are not. Precisely because operating
a railroad is not designed to kill, the
fact that passengers died when a train
went off the rails is conclusive proof
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that a serious mistake occurred.
When the number of victims is determined-usually without too much
difficulty-the extent of the tragedy
is clear. All that remains is to figure
out what went wrong, to compensate
the victims' families, and to take steps
to keep the fatal error from occurring again.
But when the state executes even
hundreds of people, those deaths
provide no convincing evidence that
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the system did or did not miscarry or
that innocent people did or did not
die. This is principally because the
execution of the innocent is notoriously difficult to prove.
Once an execution for murder occurs (all American executions are for
murder), both the victim of the offense and the person convicted of
September-October 2002

committing it are dead. The most important sources of information are
unavailable. Nor ( surprisingly to
most lay persons) do appellate and
post-conviction decisions directly
shed light on the subject. Those proceedings typically do not address the
question of guilt or innocence but,
instead, the sufficiency of the evi-

dence (an eyewitness identification
will always suffice, though the risk of
error may be very high) and the legality of the procedures used to determine guilt and sentence. As a result, it is not infrequently the case
that a man or woman will be legally
and procedurally approved by the

courts for execution despite serious
factual questions about his or her substantive guilt.'

Nor is there any systematic effort
to determine whether executed individuals were innocent-even
where guilt was not at all clear. Although it would be unthinkable for
a train wreck in which people may
have died to pass without a meticulous effort to find innocent victims,
there is no effort at all to distinguish
the innocent executed from the
guilty. It is, to begin with, a first principle of triage among understaffed
capital defense lawyers to let the
state bury the executed, regardless
of doubts about their guilt, and to
attend to the thousands of con-
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(2000).
2. See Lockyer, "Guilt Revisited: A Comparative
Perspective on Canada, the United Kingdom and
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L. REV. 121 (1988); Bedau and Radelet, The Myth
of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41
STAN. L. Rrv. 161 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Statement of William G. Otis before
the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, Concerning "Protecting the Innocent:
Proposals to Reform the Death Penalty,"June 18,
2002.
6. See United States v. Quinones, No. S3 00 Cr.
761 (JSR) (uly 1, 2002), at 21-22 & n.l (listing
relevant cases).
7. See, e.g., Liebman, The Overproduction of
Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2048-51 n.84
(2000) (collecting sources).

demned who are still alive. Unlike
Canada and Great Britain, no
American jurisdiction provides for
formal inquests into potential miscarriages once appellate proceed2
ings have ended.
Even more troubling, in my opinion, the states' attorneys with custody
over the best evidence of the guilt or
innocence of the executed-the confidential file in the case that may, for
example, include potentially conclusive biological evidence of the identity of the killer-have almost all refused to release the evidence.
Recently, in fact, prosecutors have
enlisted the assistance of state legislatures and courts to require the destruction of this best evidence of the
guilt or innocence of executed individuals for the stated reason that, if
DNA tests on evidence in the state's
confidential file invalidated a verdict,
"it would be shouted from the rooftops that the Commonwealth of Virginia executed an innocent man."'
Indicative of the difficulty of proving that an executed person is innocent, and of the high burden of proof
that applies, is an exchange between
Bedau and Radelet and Markman
and Cassell.4 Bedau and Radelet marshaled strong evidence that American jurisdictions have executed a
number of innocent individuals. In
response, Markman and Cassell declared a stalemate based on the burden of proof. Without saying that they
had proven, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that the executed individuals were guilty,
Markman and Cassell argued that
since judicial determinations of guilt
preceded each execution, Bedau and
Radelet bore the burden of proving
the defendant's innocence beyond
any doubt, then pronounced the burden unmet because the historical
record was imperfect.
Another peculiarity of the capital
context is the reaction to this stalemate, which is resignation rather
than precautionary risk analysis.
Even though the number of fatalities
from the errant operation of railways,
the unsafe packing of meat, or inadequate security inspections at airports can be, and are, documented, it
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would be the height of irresponsibility to await conclusive proof of past
fatalities before taking determined
steps to assess and diminish the risk
that deaths will occur in the future.
Amtrak, Hormel, and the FAA simply
have no immunity from safety concerns on the ground that "no one has
died yet, and until we're sure someone has, we don't have to assess the
reliability in fact of activities we have
designed in theory to provide safe
travel and hamburgers." Post-accident body counts and resulting inquests are always complementedand in the best of worlds are avoided
entirely-by efforts to assess and
lower the risk of flaws that could kill
innocent people in the future.
Until now, however, criminal justice officials have declined to accept
any similar responsibility to systematically assess and diminish the risk of
flaws and innocent fatalities in the
operation of the death penalty. Their
view has been precisely that until we
are 100 percent sure that innocent
people have been executed, there is
no reason to assess the reliability in
fact of procedures that have been designed in theory to make accurate decisions about who deserves to die.5

Evidence of the risk
This is not because there is no evidence of a risk of innocent fatalities
in the operation of the death penalty.
In addition to the troubling cases
identified by Bedau and Radelet,
consider that 101 individuals sentenced to die during the modern
death-sentencing era have subsequently been acquitted of the capital
offense and released, including dozens about whom there is no doubt
that they were innocent.6 Moreover,
many of these individuals were approved for execution by reviewing
courts, leaving the discovery of their
innocence to entirely unpredictable
fortuities-a film makers' doggedness in one case, a college journalism
project in another, a burglary of a
prosecutor's office in a third case,
and a posthumous DNA analysis (after, and because, the inmate had died
of cancer while awaiting execution)
7
in a fourth case.
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DNA is itself a fortuity. The flaws it
reveals are potentially characteristic
of all criminal cases-mistaken eyewitness identifications, perjury by
jailhouse informants, incompetent
defense lawyering, and prosecutorial
suppression of evidence. But DNA
can make these flaws apparent in
only the small proportion of cases
that fortuitously have biological evidence to test.
Additional circumstantial evidence
of the capital system's inability to
generate confidence in the accuracy
of its outcomes is the lack of confidence that capital prosecutors typically display when asked to permit
DNA testing to confirm or disprove
the guilt of executed individuals.
Prosecutors are well placed to estimate the accuracy of verdicts they
obtain that subsequently were carried out. The fact that they
usually refuse to permit tests that, at
no fiscal cost to the state, could categorically confirm the reliability of
their work if it was reliable is explicable only if they have some reason to
worry that their work was not reliable.
Evidence of this sort recently led
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor to acknowledge "'serious
questions about whether the death
penalty is being fairly administered
in the United States." In a speech last
summer, Justice O'Connor-who
voted to reinstate the death penalty
in Arizona in 1973 when she was a
leader of the state legislature, and
who has approved numerous executions while on the bench-stated that
"'[i]f statistics are any indication, the
system may well be allowing some in8
nocent defendants to be executed.'A year to the day later, United States
DistrictJudge Jed S. Rakoff, a former
federal prosecutor with a reputation
as a conservative on criminal justice
issues, reached a similar conclusion:
[T]he best available evidence indicates
that ... innocent people are sentenced to
death with materially greater frequency
than was previously supposed and that..
. convincing proof of their innocence often does not emerge until long after
their convictions. It is therefore fully
foreseeable that in enforcing the death
penalty a meaningful number of inno80 Judicature Volume 86, Number 2

cent people will be executed who otherwise would eventually be able to prove
their innocence.9
Despite this evidence, no American jurisdiction has a method for
assessing the risk of flaws in its
death penalty system with potentially fatal consequences for innocent defendants. The kernel of
such a method has been developed,
however, by a multidisciplinary
team of Columbia researchers, of
which I am a member.10

Assessing the risk
To see the logic of our approach,
consider that most social activity includes a method for inspecting the
reliability of products and services,
with two important goals. One goal is
to keep each flawed product or service from harming anyone by getting it out of circulation while the
flaw is cured or the item is scrapped.
A second goal is to analyze the frequency and pattern of all flaws in order to assess the risk of future harm
and devise prophylactic measures.
Inspections thus may reveal systemic
problems (e.g., poor management or
oversight) that are associated both
with a high rate of modest flaws (e.g,
blemishes in paintjobs and grinding
transmissions) and with rare but serious accidents (e.g., fatalities when
steering wheels disengage). Evidence of the former problems then
can be used to signal the need for
remedial steps before the latter tragedy occurs. 1
The capital system also uses inspections-appeals and post-conviction review-but only for the first of
these purposes. The sole reason for
identifying flaws is to remove the
particularverdict from circulation
and require it to be retried or replaced with a lesser outcome. Reviewing courts almost never consider whether the reversible error is
part of a pattern of flaws in cases involving, for example, the same trial
judge, prosecutor, defense lawyer,
type of evidence, theory of liability,
or procedure. Nor do reviewing
courts even keep track of capital verdicts' overall rates of success or failure on appeal. Far less do they pub-
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lish the results of such inquiries so
the relevant actors, disciplinary officials, the press and the public can
take warranted adulatory or remedial steps. And no significance of
any sort is attached to the largest category of errors-those that are recognized but ruled non-reversible
because they are harmless, nonprejudicial, or waived. No account
thus is taken of the insight from
other contexts that patterns of even
minor errors can signal the need for
remedial action to lower the risk of
potentially tragic flaws.

A systematic analysis
Based on a retrospective study of the
sort that other activities embed in
their routine inspection and risk-assessment procedures, our Columbia
University team concluded that information of great value to the relevant
actors, regulators, and the public can
be extracted from a systematic analysis of the results of capital appeals.
Chief among that information is important evidence that the risk of executing the innocent is well above
the "extremely" low level that is
widely acknowledged to be necessary
if the death penalty's integrity and
penological value is to be maintained.i2

Our study reviewed the outcomes
on judicial review of the more than
5,800 death verdicts that were imposed by the 34 active death-sentencing states and 1,004 active death-sentencing counties between 1973 and
1995. During that period, more than
4,500 of the verdicts were finally reviewed on direct appeal, of which 41
percent had reversible flaws. An additional 10 percent of the verdicts that
survived direct review were reversed
on state post-conviction review. And
8. AP, O'Connor Questions Death Penalty, New
York Times,July 4, 2001, at 9.
9. United States v. Quinones, supra n. 6, at 2, 21.
10. My colleagues, to whom I am indebted for
much of the analysis in this piece, are Jeffrey
Fagan, Andrew Gelman, Valerie West, Alexander
Kiss, and Garth Davies.
11. See, e.g., Abernathy, et al., A STITCH IN TIME:
LEAN RETAILING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MANUFACTURING-LESSONs FROM THE APPAREL AND TEXTILE

INDUSTRIES (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University

Press, 1999).
12. See, e.g., Markman and Cassell, supra n. 4, at
159.

13. 47 = 41 reversed on direct review + 6 reversed on state post-conviction review (.10 x the
59 that survived direct review).
14. 68 = 47 reversed by the state courts + 21 reversed by federal courts (.40 x the 53 that survived
state court review). See Liebman, Fagan, Gelman,
West, Kiss and Davies, A Broken System, Part IL Why
There Is So Much Errorin CapitalCases, and What Can
Be Done About It, http://www.law.columbia.edu/
brokensystem2/ (Feb. 11, 2002), at 9, 19.

41 percent of the death verdicts that
survived state court review and were
fully inspected by federal courts were
overturned. The upshot of this 23year track record is that, for any given
100 fully reviewed verdicts, an average of 47 were reversed by the state
September-October 2002

courts,13 and 68 of the 100 were reversed by either the state or federal
14

courts.

Indicating that these high reversal
rates reflect badly on the accuracy of
most capital verdicts are the following findings: (1) Verdicts with reVolume 86, Number 2 Judicature 81

versible flaws were more than twice
as common as verdicts without such
flaws. (2) Rates of reversible error
were greater than 50 percent in 20
of the 23 study years and in 29 of the
34 study states. (3) Flaws usually are
reversible only if they are shown to
have a-or, often, a strong-capacity
to change the outcome. (4) The decision makers who apply these standards and find so much reversible
error have strong political incentives to approve capital verdicts absent clear flaws with a demonstrable
capacity to skew the outcome.
Ninety percent of the reversals were
by judges subject to electoral discipline in jurisdictions with strong
public support for the death penalty.
More than half of the remaining reversals were by judges appointed by
Republican presidents with strong
law-and-order agendas. (5) At the
(state post-conviction and federal
habeas) review stages where we collected data, more than 75 percent of
the reversals were for violations that
greatly compromise the reliability of
the outcome (egregiously incompetent lawyering, prosecutorial suppression of evidence of innocence
or mitigation, faulty jury instructions, and biased judges or jurors).
(6) And at the (state post-conviction) stage where we collected data,
82 percent of the retrials necessitated by reversals resulted in a different outcome after the error was
cured, including 9 percent that
15
ended in acquittals.
Multiple regression analyses identify states, counties, and cases where
the risk of capital error is especially
high. (1) The more often states and
counties use the death penalty per
1,000 homicides, the higher their
capital error rates, and (for counties)
the higher their rates of convicting
people who are not guilty. (2) Among
the strongest predictors of higher reversal rates are political pressures to
use the death penalty not as a punishment for only the worst of the worst,
but instead as a generalized response
to fears about crime. High error rates
thus are associated with ineffective
crime-fighting policies (low rates of
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apprehending and punishing serious
criminals); frequent interactions between affluent white residents and
African-Americans and welfare recipients; and high rates of homicide
victimization in the white as compared to the black community. (3)
States that require judges to stand for
election frequently in contested
races have higher capital error rates
on direct appeal and federal habeas
than states where judges face less or
no electoral pressure. (4) States that
spend less money on their court systems have higher capital error rates
on direct appeal than states that provide average or better funding for
their courts. Overall, Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and Texas appear to have the highest overall risk
of serious error. Colorado and Connecticut appear to have the lowest
16
risk.
Additional findings indicate a substantial risk that even the most serious of errors-including conviction
of the innocent-will escape detection by existing capital review procedures. (1) More than 60 percent of
the 101 people released from death
row since 1973 because they were not
guilty were initially approved for execution by one, two, or even a full
complement of three levels of judicial review. (2) Case studies of innocent individuals who were approved
for execution by all three levels of
court review reveal a strong propensity on the part of state and federal
judges to identify the errors that in
retrospect are known to have led an
innocent person to be convicted and
condemned, but to affirm verdicts
nonetheless on the ground that the
errors were "harmless," non-prejudicial or waived. (3) The 41 percent-10
percent-40 percent pattern of reversal rates at the three successive review
stages does not exhibit the sharply
downward trend of remaining flaws,
dwindling to nearly zero, that one expects in a fully effective progression
of inspections. (4) Multiple regression analyses reveal that, everything
else equal, prisoners lucky enough to
be represented by highly paid lawyers
from well-staffed big-city law firms
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are almost 70 percent more likely to
obtain federal relief than are the majority of prisoners with less well-paid
lawyers from more poorly staffed offices.' 7 (5) Outcomes of capital appeals appear to be affected by how
politically controversial it is to reverse the verdicts, regardless of how
flawed they may be."

Limiting the risk
These findings prompted us to identify reforms for limiting the risk of
capital error and execution of the innocent."5 Four additional conclusions are especially pertinate to this
symposium. First, the obstacles that
keep policy makers from directly
measuring the frequency with which
innocent people are executed should
not keep them from systematically assessing the risk of such tragedies using all available evidence. This is especially so because the obstacles
either are unavoidable or are imposed by officials with an incentive to
obscure potential mistakes.
Second, all participants in the
death penalty system should be under a strong obligation to make public all evidence in their control
about the reliability of their operations. Third, the amount and pattern of reversible error provides important evidence of the risk of
unreliability in capital verdicts. Appellate and post-conviction courts,
justice officials, and state and local
commissions should make it their
business to study those patterns and
to share the results with the relevant
actors and the public. Finally, our
initial study of those patterns of serious capital error indicates that the
risk of executing the innocent is too
high for comfort. n

15. Id at 11-81.
16. Id. at 337-390.
17. See id. at 376-386.
18. For example, after controlling for other
factors, state court reversal rates decrease if the
verdict is from a rural community (where the
smaller number of such verdicts make the reversal of any one of them more controversial than in
urban communities) or the reviewing court has a
large, potentially controversial backlog of capital
verdicts awaiting inspection. See id. at 194, 218219, 333-334, 354-356, 367-369.
19. See id. at 391-421.

